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Marking to Market: 
Can Accounting Rules Shake the Foundations of Capitalism? 
 
Richard A. Epstein 
M. Todd Henderson* 
 
Abstract 
 
Mark-to-market accounting helps create asset bubbles and exacerbate 
their negative collateral consequences when they burst. It does the latter 
by forcing the hand of counterparties to demand collateral even when it is 
inefficient to do so. Watchful waiting and inaction is often the more 
efficient course of action. Yet often this is the road not taken, out of fear of 
litigation and regulatory sanctions. Nonetheless, as a business matter, 
forbearance on foreclosure may well make sense if the party is optimistic 
about future values and a collateral call would generate assets sales that, 
under present mark-to-market rules, would negatively impact these 
values. But if the party forbears and is wrong about the future values, 
shareholders may sue the firm for not exercising its legal rights in order to 
protect their interests. Because future values are uncertain, litigation costs 
are high, and courts are likely to make some mistakes, firms will demand 
excessive levels of collateral.  
In this environment, the high transaction costs of coordination and 
fear of potential antitrust liability can combine to cause a rush to seize or 
demand collateral, even when collective forbearance would be more 
efficient. These problems of imperfect litigation and antitrust rules will 
sometimes cause action to be taken when inaction would be the more 
efficient course. Deleveraging cascades will result, thereby increasing the 
risk of financial meltdown. 
This article explores these and other issues surrounding the mark-to-
market controversy. No system of valuing a firm’s assets and liabilities is 
perfect, so our critique of mark to market does not clinch the case for the 
reinstating historical cost accounting. Rather our goal is to simply point 
out previously unrecognized problems with mark to market, based on their 
interaction with the legal system. Armed with an understanding of how 
litigation risk can influence market participants’ behavior under different 
valuation rules may help standard setters in the industry modify the 
existing rules to reduce the chance of future market meltdowns. 
 
                                                 
* James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, the University of Chicago Law 
School, Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution, and visiting professor 
New York University Law School; Assistant Professor of Law, the University of Chicago Law 
School respectively. We thank Douglas Baird, Dan Currell, Jens Dammann, Christian Leuz, Saul 
Levmore, Jonathan Masur, and James Spindler for their valuable comments.  
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”There is no such uncertainty as a sure thing.”† 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 There is nothing like profound financial dislocation to spur inquiry into 
the first principles of political economy. In some cases it is over grand issues 
about the relationship of state to market. In other cases it is about smaller, more 
technical, issues that prove very large in practice. This paper is about one such 
issue, whether mark-to-market is the proper technique to account for hard-to-
value assets. The question raises a tension between two techniques of valuation 
each with its own imperfections.  
 The first of these uses historical cost as the benchmark for valuing assets. 
The method starts with cost and then makes certain formal adjustments to 
estimate the value of an asset that has not been sold. For example, the normal 
rules for valuing real estate improvement starts with their costs, and then reduces 
that basis by an allowance for depreciation, which is granted wholly without 
regard to the changes in market value of the underlying asset. The system is not 
wholly arbitrary because (unlike financial assets) it is known at the outset that in 
the end, a fully depreciated asset will be worth zero. In the interim an asset that 
costs 100 could have its basis adjusted downward under the “straight-line” 
method by 5 each year, so that at the close of the second year it is carried at 90. A 
tax deduction is given for 10, whether the market value of the asset is 70 or 110. 
The difference between this “adjusted” basis of 90 and the market value is taken 
into account as income (or loss) only on the disposition of the asset. This method 
is based on the view that the greater precision in value that one might get by 
revaluing the asset to market value on a periodic basis costs more than it is 
worth. The errors in this estimation technique are normally not serious because, 
again in contrast with financial assets, of the low rate of transfer for assets of this 
class. 
 The alternative to this system of historical cost requires the revaluation of 
unsold assets to market prices on a periodic basis. Accountants typically refer to 
this system as “fair value accounting” while tax lawyers and others use the 
equivalent term “mark to market.” Mark-to-market accounting became popular 
after regulators accused thrifts of hiding “bad” assets by using historical cost 
accounting during the period leading up to the S&L crisis in the 1980s. In 
response, the mark-to-market rule was adopted to increase the transparency of 
valuations. The mark-to-market process requires that the firms attach values to 
assets before they are sold in order to improve the “transparency” of the firm 
                                                 
† Attributed to the Scottish poet Robert Burns. 
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both to government regulators and to present and future trading partners.1 It is 
for just this reason that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in its 
recent report rejected recommendations to suspend the mark-to-market 
standard.2 The calls for suspension or elimination were made by those who 
believe mark to market contributed to the current financial crisis. Some powerful 
members of Congress believe this, and a held a series of hearings in which mark 
to market was blamed in part for exacerbating the credit crunch. In the wake of 
these hearings, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) adopted a new 
rule allowing firms to mark to an imaginary “orderly market” when none exists in 
order to blunt the impact of mark to market in illiquid markets or times. Whether 
(and if so, how) mark to market contributed to the credit crunch is the topic of 
this essay.  
The SEC’s view that mark to market does more good than harm is adopted 
by many modern writers on the subject. Caprio, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Kane have 
claimed that the mark to market rules are needed to combat various forms of 
opportunism:  
 
Especially at large and complex financial institutions, individual 
managers have strong incentives to discover and to exercise 
reporting options that overstate their capital and understate 
their exposure to loss. This expands their ability to extract 
implicit subsidies that risk-taking can generate from implicit 
safety-net support.3  
 
The authors support their conclusion by noting, correctly, that the opacity of 
many balance sheets is accentuated by the use of special purpose vehicles that 
allow for certain transactions to be kept off the books, which create further 
opportunities for “arbitraging the regulatory system.”4  
 Notwithstanding these strong claims, we think that the matter does not 
admit of such an easy resolution. In our view, there is no first best solution to the 
                                                 
 1 See, e.g., Justin Fox, “Suspending market-to-market is for zombies,” The Curious 
Capitalist Blog, Oct. 1, 2008, available at  
http://curiouscapitalist.blogs.time.com/2008/10/01/suspending_marktomarket_is_for. The 
Financial Accounting Standards Board adopted mark to market for financial instruments and 
immediately in the wake of the S&L scandals of the late 1980s. See FAS 107, “Disclosures about 
Fair Value of Financial Instruments, Dec. 1991. 
 2 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, “Congressionally-Mandated Study Says 
Improve, Do Not Suspend, Fair Value Accounting Standards,” December 30, 2008, 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-307.htm. To be precise, fair value accounting 
represents a broad class of rules that reject historical cost-based accounting. Mark-to-market is 
one powerful rule in this group. 
3 Gerard Caprio, Jr., et al., “The 2007 Meltdown in Structured Securitization: Searching 
for Lessons not Scapegoats,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4756, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1293169. 
4 Id.  
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valuation question for certain complex assets. The question is which of the two 
estimation methods—historical cost or market to market—produces on average 
the fewer errors. It is common ground that the mark-to-market rules are sensible 
for assets in thick markets—where lots of buyers and sellers make market prices 
the most reliable. Although more work (especially empirical work) needs to be 
done, we think that for hard-to-value assets, the combination of available theory 
and evidence suggests that the use of mark to market (and its cousin, mark to 
model) helps create bubbles and, when they burst, to exacerbate their negative 
collateral consequences, including the disintegration of lending markets and the 
dissolution of solvent firms.  
Mark-to-market accounting does this, in part, by forcing the hand of 
counterparties to demand collateral even when it would be efficient for them to 
refrain from such demands. Parties act in an economically inefficient way 
because mark-to-market rules do not operate in a vacuum but within the 
framework of other forms of legal regulation. Specifically, counterparties that do 
not demand collateral on the ground of reasonable but ultimately erroneous 
estimates of future value, will face (ex-post biased) litigation from their 
shareholders who are worse off than they would have been as a result. Visibility 
begets liability, and prevents rational forbearance that makes sense for individual 
firms. Familiar collective action problems may also inhibit rational forbearance—
a problem bankruptcy law is intended to solve in extreme cases, but does not this 
side of a bankruptcy filing. The dangers of only compounded because regulators 
may also demand certain actions to respond to these transparent accounts that 
they might not have required of holders of private assets. 
Although having a lender call for additional collateral in the face of 
increased risk seems at first blush to always make sense, this is not the case. 
Under certain circumstances, forbearance from legal or contractual rights may be 
sensible to avoid devaluation cascades. These cascades are likely to arise under 
mark-to-market rules. Here is how. As noted above, mark to market generates 
excessive collateral calls because of the fear of litigation or regulatory 
consequence if asset values turn out to be worse than expected. In that case, 
shareholders or the government will sue, alleging that they have sustained harm 
not taking sufficient collateral. At this juncture, they face the risk any court will 
suffer from hindsight bias, or simply make random errors to the same effect. To 
forestall that risk, on the margin, the creditors will demand excess collateral even 
if it is not efficient to do so. Collateral calls will, in turn, require asset sales by the 
holder of the collateral. These distress sales, in already thin markets and under 
adverse conditions, will be at lower values, which, in a world with mark to 
market, creates further reductions in the value of all of the firm’s assets of similar 
character, and thus additional collateral calls. Other firms are then caught in the 
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undertow with their assets. And so on. This is a devaluation cascade, and it can 
destroy even solvent financial institutions.  
General forbearance thus might also make sense for firms not involved in 
the particular deal but invested in similar asset classes. Collective action might 
thus be sensible in light of the rules, but as discussed below, many legal 
doctrines—e.g., fiduciary duties, antitrust, and so on—stand in the way of 
implementing these second-order solutions. Mark to market might be a problem 
without a work around. Regulation need not discourage opportunism; it can 
stimulate it as well.  
We hope that as parties learn they might well choose to contract around 
the accounting rules in favor of other regimes that require disclosure but not 
foreclosure. In light of our current knowledge, we are hesitant to predict what 
these optimal contracts might require or whether they will arise. Exactly how this 
plays out in the future is a difficult question, and there is no guarantee that the 
conclusion we reach today will hold tomorrow. The one point on which we are 
confident is that current contracts were underpowered relative to the undisclosed 
systematic risks they faced. But this sad truth is not a fixed fact of nature. There is 
some recent empirical work showing through experiments that the likelihood of 
bubbles decreases as novel players learn the ropes.5 It could well be that the next 
time round the experience gained with mark-to-market accounting could 
ameliorate the effects that we see here. But for the moment at least, we think that 
the pressures from both liability regimes and regulatory bodies will prevent the 
needed corrections from taking place. To see why, requires a more detailed 
analysis of the valuation process.  
 
II. The Importance of Valuation 
 
We come to this debate about rules for valuation because financial 
institutions must devise some proper rule for valuing their assets. Everyone 
regards this function as critical for many different reasons, of which the most 
fundamental is whether a given institution is or is not solvent at any given time. 
Market valuations are required for other reasons, such as to decide whether a 
party that has purchased stocks, bonds, or other financial instruments on credit 
has to make good on margin call. To see how this operates, assume that an 
investor buys a stock for $100, of which $10 is his own cash, and $90 is funds 
borrowed from a brokerage house. The brokerage house secures its loan by 
reserving the right to sell the shares, which it keeps in its possession, when the 
value of the stock threatens to slip below the amount of the unpaid loan. When 
the price goes up, the investor becomes more secure because the dollar value of 
                                                 
5 Ernan Haruvy, et al., Traders' Expectations in Asset Markets: Experimental 
Evidence, 97 Am. Econ. Rev. 1901 (2007). 
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his equity cushion increases. But if the value of the stock goes down, the broker 
will issue a “margin call” which puts the borrower to the unhappy choice of 
adding more capital into the account or having the broker sell the stock in order 
to collect its underlying debt. At that point, the broker gets his $90 first, before 
the investor gets the residual, if any. Conversely, if the security is not sufficient to 
cover the debt, the broker house is entitled, in principle at least, to collect a so-
called deficiency judgment for the remainder. Leverage is double-edged sword—
wonderful in good times but horrific in bad times. 
The inability of the government to initially buy its way out of the current 
credit crisis is another example of this phenomenon. Banks made highly 
leveraged bets on house values that turned out to be bad. These were made when 
leverage ratios on Wall Street rose from levels of 12 to 1 to over 30 to 1 in the past 
decade. (To put this in perspective, a fully levered firm that saw its assets fall by 
just over 3 percent would find itself insolvent.) That said, the plot now thickens.  
Not only did the original lender bet with another party on a specific asset, 
but third parties with no attachment or ownership interest in the asset made side 
bets on the original asset-specific hedges. This secondary market—effectively 
legalized gambling for desirable social ends—was many times larger than the 
primary market. It was tolerated and even encouraged because it provided 
liquidity and information to the market for primary loans. But there was a 
problem with this leverage and risk amplification in the secondary markets. 
When house prices started to drop, counterparties to these bets demanded 
collateral, just as in the example of the stockbroker above.  
But the nature of the assets aggravated the problem. Since the bets were 
correlated and the size of the secondary market was unconstrained by any real-
world assets, the amounts of collateral needed to offset the increased risk was 
orders of magnitude bigger than the losses being experienced in the primary 
markets. (The problem was made worse by the mark-to-market devaluation 
spiral.) These secondary markets became in effect a black hole for collateral that 
simply sucked monies from the Treasury. The government intended the money to 
be used for new loans to stimulate economic growth, but they instead were used 
to shore up fragile balance sheets caused by these enormous leveraged bets and 
the resulting collateral cascade. 
The margin call is but one of many occasions where valuation decisions 
influence real world behavior. More difficult valuation decisions arise, for 
example, with loans or joint ventures, which manage complex financial assets 
that are difficult to value. Nonetheless, private parties by contract often stipulate 
for a change in control of the business—the board of directors appointed by the 
old investors is out, and a new board appointed by the creditors is in—if the value 
of the portfolio assets sink below a certain level. In many of these business 
arrangements, that change of control takes place in a no-excuse environment. 
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Good efforts and hard work do not allow the borrowers to retain control of the 
firm if the benchmarks set out in the agreement are not met. The lenders can, if 
they choose, waive their control rights, but they cannot be compelled to do so. 
Errors may be made in individual cases, but we believe that that no regulatory 
regime can outperform the creditors in both valuing and managing these 
traditional risks. 
 
III. A Small-Government Rationale for Bank Regulation 
 
These rules on valuation are not only important in private agreements, but 
also for government regulation, especially of the banking industry. The rationale 
for that regulation runs as follows. Banks can only make money if they lend the 
deposits they receive to borrowers at rates sufficient to cover the cost of capital, 
the risk of default, and the administrative expenses of running the entire 
operation. In order for banks to succeed, therefore, they must invest at least some 
portion of their deposits in long-term mortgages or other kinds of illiquid 
financial instruments—i.e., assets that cannot be converted immediately to cash. 
In ordinary times, a bank keeps enough cash and liquid assets on hand to meet 
the short-term variations in the demand for deposit withdrawals. To reduce the 
risk of a mismatch between long and short positions, banks can enter into 
cooperative lending agreements that allow one bank to lend money to a second 
that faces for idiosyncratic reasons a sudden spike in the level of withdrawals.  
 Sometimes, however, the demand for withdrawal of deposits will not be 
random. Whenever common public events spur all depositors to demand their 
money at the same time, the bank is at risk of a “run” on its accounts, which, as 
viewers of “It’s a Wonderful Life” know, could wipe out a solvent bank that does 
not have the instantaneous ability to convert its illiquid assets to cash. Interbank 
arrangements won’t help if all of the cooperating banks are subject to the same 
stress owing to external events. In these instances, the government acts as 
guarantor of last resort for the repayment of loans through the system of deposit 
insurance. It acts on the happy assumption that if depositors know that they have 
assurances from the only party with access to the printing press, they have no 
need to pull out their money in times of stress.  
 Yet the solution to bank run creates another problem. Let the depositors 
know that their loans are secure, and they will care little about the prudence of 
their bank’s lending operations. The government guarantee satisfies their worries 
no matter how badly the bank performs. This is the familiar moral hazard 
problem, and it inevitably leads to a less than optimal amount of private 
monitoring of bank risk taking. It therefore falls on the government, as it falls on 
every guarantor, to take steps to monitor the bank so that it does not engage in 
risky activities that could trigger claims against it under the guarantee. Out of the 
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government’s need to control moral hazard by its banks, the system of bank 
regulation has been borne. 
 Just as with the private financial agreements, the questions of valuation 
become absolutely critical. There are bad consequences both ways, for it makes 
little sense to close down banks that are solvent, and little sense to allow them to 
continue their losing operations (when they may make risky, double-or-nothing 
bets) if they have fallen insolvent. The worst risk of all is that the bank insiders 
know of the insolvency before the federal examiners.  
 Government attempts to reduce moral hazard problems, however, can be 
expected to beget new problems, including novel forms of moral hazard. For 
example, government regulation designed to “solve” the private monitoring 
hazard problem took the form of “capital adequacy requirements,” which 
mandated banks hold a certain percentage of their capital in reserve to cover 
potential defaults on outstanding loans.6 This capital is not productive from the 
perspective of banks’ shareholders, so banks can be expected to find ways to 
nevertheless deploy it. The banks did so primarily through exotic derivatives, like 
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), which allowed them to originate loans 
(and take the fees associated with them), while shifting the risk off to others, and 
thus freeing up their capital to make more loans (and fees). These CDOs allowed 
even larger amounts of risk to be taken and, through Baroque structures, allowed 
risks to be diffused and attenuated to the point where no one was sure who bore 
what risk, whether the amount of risk being borne was excessive, and, if there 
were a problem, what to do about it. The regulation designed to reduce excessive 
bank risk taking ended up increasing it, as well as the overall systemic risk in the 
market. 
It is a familiar story: a problem begets a regulation, which begets attempts 
to avoid the regulation, which begets a new problem, which begets a new 
regulation, and so on.7 The argument at each regulatory stage, after failure, is that 
the problem can be solved by smarter or more efficient regulation. But, at the 
end, one is left wondering whether the game is worth the candle, since the 
endless cycle of creating, enforcing, evading, and reregulating may dwarf the 
costs of the original problem. 
So whether we deal with the private or the public space, valuation of both 
assets and liabilities is key. But are the tools, and the people, that are brought to 
bear on valuation up to that critical task? The people are as important as the 
tools, for “independent” audit committees under Sarbanes-Oxley may eliminate 
                                                 
 6 Basel Committee: International convergence of capital measurement and capital 
standards, July 1988, available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc111.htm. 
7 See M. Todd Henderson, “The Futility of Regulating Insider Trading: The Case of 10b5-
1,” University of Chicago Working Paper (2009), on file with author. 
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some conflicts of interest, but they surely create others, given that they have 
powerful incentives to stay within conventional guidelines on matters of 
valuation, even when the situation for calls independent thought and not for herd 
mentality. 
 
IV. The Many Senses of Valuation 
 
The problem here is more acute than it might appear at first blush, 
because no single rule of valuation is sufficient to cover all cases. As a threshold 
matter, it is not obvious why one set of accounting rules should apply to different 
firms, industries, business forms, and times. Valuation rules that work for banks 
might not make sense for utilities; what works for well-followed publicly traded 
firms might not work for closely held private ones; and what works during good 
times might not work in bad ones. In fact, there is no reason to believe one rule 
fits all or at all times. For example, mark-to-market rules seem to perform badly 
when assets are long lived, illiquid, or senior in status, which is the case for the 
assets held by most banks. In light of this heterogeneity, one might expect to see 
different rules applied in different states, industries, or contexts. Such a 
competitive system would allow for not only localized or temporal variation, but 
also a process through which different accounting rules could be tested over time 
to help develop the most optimal ones.8  
Unfortunately, this portrait does not capture the way the world looks. 
First, there is one set of accounting rules promulgated by FASB known as 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP)) that applies to all firms in the 
US. Whether a monopoly provider of accounting rules is efficient in this context 
is the subject for another essay. 
Second, different types of assets within any individual firm may be subject 
to different rules depending on their nature and various external circumstances. 
It is this context that FASB (under the auspices of the SEC) has developed its own 
set of “fair value” rules. The fair value definitions of FAS 157, state: “Fair value is 
the price that would be received to sell an asset or paid to transfer a liability in an 
orderly transaction between market participants at the measurement date.”9  
                                                 
8 See, e.g., R.A. Dye & S. Sunder, Why not allow FASB and IASB standards to compete in 
the US?, 15 ACCOUNTING HORIZONS 257 (2001). This is a familiar argument in corporate law, 
where firms have a choice of the state law that will govern their internal affairs. See Ralph K. 
Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 
251 (1977). One can imagine a similar regime for accounting rules, with firms free to choose from 
competing accounting regimes offered by states, nations, or other regulatory entities. Cf. ROBERTA 
ROMANO, THE ADVANTAGE OF COMPETITIVE FEDERALISM FOR SECURITIES REGULATION (2003 AEI 
Press) (making this argument for securities regulation). 
 9 See, SEC Study on Mark-to-Market Accounting, at 23, available at 
www.sec.gov/news/studies/2008/marktomarket123008.pdf. For definitions, see FAS NO. 157, ¶ 
5. 
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In cases where quoted market prices are available, these prices can be used 
in so-called “Level 1” analysis. Where the exact security is not traded, but others 
like it are, “Level 2” analysis requires that extrapolations be made across relevant 
markets. Finally, sometimes valuation involves “Level 3” assets the SEC notes 
“represents measurements that incorporate significant unobservable inputs that 
reflect the reporting entity’s own assumptions regarding valuation parameters 
that market participants would use.”10 These are called “mark-to-model” 
estimates: the firm holding the hard-to-value asset estimates its value based on 
internal models, and then reports those values. 
Level 1 calculations present few, if any, problems. Mutual funds that invest 
all their assets in the publicly traded stocks and bonds of listed corporations 
routinely report exact values of their holdings on a daily basis. Thick markets 
with fungible assets create the “orderly” market needed for to make precise 
valuations.  
But all too often valuation veers off into both Level 2 and Level 3 territory, 
where the line between these two categories and Level 1 is less clear that many in 
industry think. Thus the increased sophistication found in the design of modern 
assets—e.g., fancy financial derivatives, like CDOs—compromises the clarity that 
attaches to traditional pools of financial assets. Modern financial wizards slice 
and dice stocks, bonds, and mortgages into ever-thinner slices, which are then 
recombined for resale to the general market as securitized products.  
A single home mortgage, for example, can be thought of as a collection of 
individual monthly payments for 30 years. The first month from a like group of 
home mortgages can be bundled into one package and sold to buyers who want 
that income stream. The same can be done with every other tranche. To put this 
issue into the appropriate context, two large investment banks—Goldman Sachs 
and Lehman Brothers—had over 8 percent of their assets (or a combined $100 
billion) classified as Level 3 assets as of March 2008.11 This elementary example 
does not begin to capture the complexity of the financial bundles that human 
ingenuity can create. But complicated or not, valuation still remains a critical 
trigger under both private agreements and public banking regulations.  
These complexities can have real consequences on the use of alternative 
valuation techniques. One common alternative to market values is a system that 
discounts future cash flows to present values. In principle, this system could be 
superior to historical cost because it takes into account subsequent movements of 
the underlying security. And it could avoid some of the risks of cascade inherent 
in the mark to market system by assigning higher values to the various 
                                                 
 10 FAS No. 157, ¶ 5. 
 11 See Yalman Onaran, “Goldman Sachs Level 3 Assets Jump, Exceeding Rivals',” 
Bloomberg.com, Apr. 9, 2008, available at  
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=a3N.I2aId51k&refer=home  
  Mark to Market / 11 
components of the asset. Indeed, it may well be that one advantage of having the 
government buy these toxic assets is that it can hold off on resale until the market 
is better. But for valuation purposes of the firm, it is just not clear that any one 
can use this method with sufficient accuracy to stave off unduly low valuations. It 
could easily follow that there is no nice third alternative between the two 
(undesirable) extremes of historical cost and mark to market. 
 
V. Historical Costs versus Fair Value 
 
So how should valuation be done, both as a matter of principle, and within 
the contours of the SEC framework? 
 For sake of simplicity, we can point to two different — indeed polar 
opposite — models of valuation that in principle converge on a common answer. 
The first of these measures, and the one mandated until very recently, is 
“historical cost accounting.” Under this method, an asset is valued on a 
company’s financial statements at its historical cost—what the firm paid for it—
less adjustments like depreciation (set formulaically by regulation) or market 
price in the event of permanent impairment of the asset. As a matter of practical 
economics, this valuation method is plainly wrong and misleading. A computer 
purchased in 2007 for $2000 is obviously not worth $2000 today, but this is the 
figure that a firm would report on its financial statements under historical cost 
accounting without depreciation. So why has this method proved so tenacious? 
Most obviously, it has the underappreciated virtue of simplicity and low 
administrative costs. Indeed, in this situation the use of some depreciation 
schedule that calls for the write-off of the computer over some three year period 
say, will improve the valuation without requiring case by case review. We are 
confident enough about the behavior of this class of assets to count this revision 
as a general improvement. Indeed, if those interested in the valuation are 
sophisticated and have good information, the fact that the corrected historical 
cost number remains misleading can be overcome by reasonable due diligence. In 
fact, as discussed below, this caveat-emptor imposed incentive to perform these 
calculations may have salutary effects that help reduce the formation and erratic 
bursting of asset bubbles. 
We hasten to add that the case or using adjusted historical cost with 
financial assets is weaker than it is in the above example, precisely because we are 
not confident of the valuation at some fixed end point. Indeed, this ability of 
financial assets to move in both directions over time means that under historical 
cost accounting firms can engage in so-called “gains trading”: they can sell only 
those securities that have appreciated in value and realize the gain. Under some 
circumstances, this could contribute to asset bubbles in ways not unlike that we 
attribute to the mark-to-market rules. Recent commentary even attributes some 
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of the rise of securitization markets to the use of historical cost accounting.12 In 
light of this, it is important to be clear that our argument is not that one form of 
accounting is clearly preferable to the other or that either is perfect. Our goal is 
simply to point out some potential weaknesses in the use of mark to market that 
have not heretofore been explored. 
 The second accounting valuation method is to report the “fair market 
value” of the asset in question, which is the price at which the asset will trade 
between a willing buyer and a willing seller when all of its attributes are known 
equally to both. Bystanders with no intention to trade don’t matter. It should be 
noted, however, that markets do not necessarily presuppose that all active buyers 
and sellers reach the same judgment on valuations. Neither side knows the 
future, so those who think that they have better command of uncertainty will 
purchase assets from persons who do not. Even parties with identical valuations 
on the median value of an asset will trade if one party has a greater capacity to 
deal with uncertainty than the other. In both cases, the market price permits 
gains to both parties, which is realized in expectation when trades take place. But 
fair market value is an estimated term for assets that can be traded, but are not. 
Here the hypothesized exchange value gives rise to a number that commonly 
suffices for all regulatory and contractual purposes. 
 The number in question, of course, can only be reached by making some 
assessment of the future cash flows that the asset will generate in different states 
of the world. In markets where transactions are random, the market value will in 
large measure rest on the best estimates of the future cash flows. It is on the 
strength of this basic insight that the mark-to-market principle is borne, for both 
public and private uses. If one is not sure whether an institution is solvent, or 
meets certain desired measures, transparency is aided by forcing it to mark all its 
assets to market in light of the available prices. If the numbers show that the 
assets thus computed exceed their liabilities, there is no reason to panic. Indeed, 
a bank whose assets has increased relative to their historical cost (i.e., what they 
paid for them, subject to certain adjustments, like depreciation for cost recovery) 
now has more liquidity, which entitles it to undertake more extensive lending 
activities under a system of fractional reserve banking.  
Conversely, fair-value estimation of both the mark to market and mark to 
model variety yield bad news if the portfolio has a current value that below its 
historical cost, or below its previous (usually quarterly) valuation. Now the 
process works in reverse. The smaller capital base becomes a sure sign that the 
institution is overextended, because, for example, it has too many mortgages on 
                                                 
12  See Christian Laux and Christian Leuz, “Making Sense of the Fair Value Debate: 
A Commentary,” University of Chicago Working Paper, available at ______. 
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its books. Accordingly, it should reduce the scope of its operations, and sell some 
of its assets in order to reduce the size and riskiness in its portfolio.  
One central tenet of the Chicago school of efficient markets is that the 
price that the asset will fetch is independent of the reason for the sale. Thick 
markets, with lots of buyers and sellers, will treat the seller who wishes to 
rebalance his portfolio in exactly the fashion as the seller who must liquidate her 
position in order to pay for emergency surgery. On this view, both private and 
public auditing conventions that trigger sales keep financial institutions on an 
even keel by shining impartial light on their operations. 
The basic argument here is that mark-to-market accounting updates the 
original cost figures by taking into account subsequent economic developments, 
which make it the superior form of accounting for both private and public 
purposes. Indeed, if any party did not perform the mark-to-market valuation for 
itself, its potential trading partners, desirous of better information, can make 
those calculations themselves. As the institution holding the asset has better 
information and has it in one place, there are obvious efficiencies for asking it to 
do the mark-to-market calculations on which—if they are accurate—all other 
parties can rely. But again, there is no free lunch. Outsiders with a special interest 
in the financial position of a single institution thus could easily find it in their 
interest to rerun the numbers, either in whole or in part.  
Manipulation of financial reporting, however, is easy (think: Enron, Bernie 
Madoff, and so on), and the accuracy of these numbers may be contestable, 
especially if the valuation systems don’t work exactly as planned. This fact points 
to a curious and overlooked irony about fair-value accounting: the approach is 
most needed in those cases where the parties who administer the system are 
likely to prove the least trustworthy. If insiders can hide the true value of assets 
from outsiders by using historical cost accounting, forcing them to use mark to 
market accounting is unlikely to prevent abuse. The insiders can work their 
schemes in other parts of the business where they retain maximum insulation or 
discretion. Mark-to-market works best where some outsiders have independent 
sources of information to corroborate the insider’s conclusion. When outsiders 
cannot readily check the veracity of the disclosed mark-to-market values, fraud 
will breed. By contrast, mark-to-market has only modest benefits for well-
regarded firms holding known assets. 
  We must offset against the potential gains from mark to market—
efficiency of aggregation and disclosure, transparency—the potential losses where 
the markets are in some sense roiled, so that it is no longer possible to assume 
that buyers and sellers are acting independently of each other, largely in response 
to changes in their private fortunes. Instead, the question is whether some 
common element undercuts the natural diversity of preferences, and sends the 
markets sharply off in one direction.  
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 One manifestation of this tendency arises with bubbles, which gain their 
name for a simple but powerful reason. They fill with air (i.e., nothing of 
substance) until they pop. The trip on the upside is rapid, and often euphoric. 
The downward slide is anything but. Asset valuations are erroneous, although 
only in retrospect, as they were after the South Sea Bubble, the Tulip Bubble, the 
equity bubble of the 1920s, the Internet Bubble, and, most recently, the Housing 
Bubble.  
 Mark-to-market rules may contribute to the “irrational exuberance,” 
because borrowing tolerances (for both firms and individuals) are typically tied to 
asset values. As asset values rise, more cash is available, which can lead to higher 
asset values based on speculation and reinvested cash. Firms with greater asset 
values can take cash out of the firm, and use it to pay executives or distribute it to 
shareholders. Enron followed this stratagem in the 1990s, when it lobbied its 
accountancy and the government to permit it to mark the contracts for the future 
supply of, say, energy or Internet services to market.13 Enron was able to claim 
future values as current values, thus permitting it through accounting mumbo 
jumbo to recognize on their books the gains before they materialized in cash 
payments.14 This same story can be told about homeowners and many businesses 
during the Housing Bubble. 
 If asset values had remained tethered to historical cost values, then less 
cash would have been available for reinvestment, and thus a less steep rise. The 
problems with this historical approach are serious whenever the increase in 
valuation rests on some economic appreciation of fundamental value. But 
distinguishing between real and imaginary value turns out to be nearly 
impossible to do reliably ex ante. After all, there were many Internet-based firms 
of the late 1990s whose future fortunes justified their meteoric rise and the gains 
to society from the cash invested in new technologies was and remains very large. 
Moreover, putting a wet blanket on all firms simply because some might turn out 
to be optimistically overvalued could prevent gains in other firms from 
materializing in the first place. The sober conclusion is that the error costs from 
both approaches are high, and the direction of the errors often uncertain. 
As noted, however, the trip on the downside is far steeper than the rise. 
Often financial publications will treat the downward slide as though it is a sharp 
continuous line, which presuppose that some trades take place at every point on 
the curve. Not so. Commonly, the downward side of markets is often radically 
discontinuous. Those who bought on the upside cannot unload their assets at any 
interim fixing until the market settles in at a new and uncomfortable low. The 
                                                 
 13 C. William Thomas, “The Rise and Fall of Enron: When a company looks too good to be 
true, it usually is,” The Journal of Accountancy, April 2002, available at 
http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/Issues/2002/Apr/TheRiseAndFallOfEnron.htm. 
 14 Id. 
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Internet Bubble that burst in 2000 is one such illustration, but only in retrospect 
was it understood to be a bubble. At least that bubble was confined to a single 
sector of the market. But the more recent bubbles in real estate, oil, steel, and 
wheat have combined to cause far greater dislocation. So in normal markets, 
mark to market may work reasonably well, whereas in bubbles, both in their 
formation and their demise, it may have a contributory role. How well does 
mark-to-market perform in these settings?  
 
VI. Accounting Rules Matter 
  
The initial puzzle in dealing with this matter is why any accounting rule 
should make a difference at all. The rule itself only indicates how the financial 
entity reports its own position. Returning to the stock asset discussed above, if 
the firm paid $100 and the price drops to $50, whether the firm reports $100 or 
$50 on its balance sheet, those with a stake in valuing the firm on an economic 
basis should not care about the accounting treatment, since it is irrelevant. An 
asset is worth what it is worth—the price it will fetch—regardless of what the 
accountants say. Obviously, the more difficult it is to value the asset in question, 
the more challenging it will be for outsiders vis-à-vis insiders to make 
adjustments to reported values to bring them in line with actual values. 
If the $100 investment in stock is in a privately held firm instead of one 
traded on public markets, for example, the calculation will be more difficult for 
outsiders since they will presumably be at an informational disadvantage relative 
to the insiders. Even in that case, however, the notes appended to the report in 
the interest of full disclosure will typically indicate the grounds for valuation, 
which allows other individuals to make their own corrections. And, as noted 
above, if the purpose of the valuation rules is to prevent abuse, it seems unlikely 
to be a remedy in cases of clear informational asymmetries, where abuse and 
potential fraud will be the easiest to achieve. 
To give but one example of the irrelevance of accounting in a world in 
which values are readily attainable, we think that it is difficult in the abstract to 
get to worked up over the question of how to properly account for stock options 
issued to employees that can only be exercised at some future date at a price 
above the traded value of the shares. One way is to account for future 
contingencies to dilute the earnings to take into account the potential new shares 
that have not yet been issued. But anyone who reads the public report could make 
the needed corrections so long as they know the status of all the various option 
programs. Accordingly, if the stock is still trading below the strike price (i.e. the 
dollar cost of exercising the option), the options will not be presently exercised, 
the reports could treat those options as though they did not exist. But no matter 
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which way the analysis starts, any interested financial party can make the 
appropriate corrections unilaterally. 
Thus, putting aside the cost bearing advantage of disclosure by insiders as 
discussed above, parties should reach the same result regardless of which starting 
point the law requires. We see, therefore, nothing wrong, or destabilizing, about a 
disclosed convention that provides no dilution when the strike price is above the 
market price, and full dilution when those lines cross. Choosing this rule is 
designed to reduce the size of the corrections made down the road. So long as all 
information is disclosed, either rule should do just fine. The same should be true 
for accounting for any other sort of value under the same assumptions of 
informational parity, no collective problems, and no litigation costs. These 
assumptions are not true in the real world, of course, which is why accounting 
rules matter. 
But how? The issue here is whether this rule can make any difference in 
this context if it does not matter in all others? And we think that the answer 
appears to be “yes” in both good times and in bad. The basic intuition here is that 
markets do not behave well once we relax the twin assumptions of randomness 
and liquidity. The point has been demonstrated, subject to the usual restrictions 
of formal models, in a paper of Franklin Allen and Elena Carletti.15 Written in 
2006 before the stock implosion they conclude “a shock in the insurance sector 
can cause the current value of banks’ assets to be less than the current value of 
their liability so the banks are insolvent.”16 That same risk does not occur when 
assets are valued on the basis of historic cost, precisely because that information 
is not updated to take into account the most recent events. The shocks therefore 
are blunted by the inertia of the now welcome historical rule. 
 As we see the situation, the basic logic works in parallel fashion on the up 
and the down side. Start with the creation of bubbles, which often begin with 
some uniform shift in the external market, which in this instance could be some 
combination of the relaxed loan standards with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 
and the spate of easy money, both of which allow assets to be bid up above their 
true value. In effect, the buyers of the real estate are impounding into the price 
the implicit value of the subsidy. As the prices start to move upward, these 
tendencies are aggravated by the positive valuations from mark-to-market 
accounting, which in turn adds additional fuel to the fire. The situation is not 
made any easier given that many of the asset pools are thinly traded and hard to 
value, so that the mark-to market process is likely introduce errors of its own, 
                                                 
15 Franklin Allen & Elena Carletti, 2008, Mark-to-Market Accounting and Liquidity 
Pricing, 45 J. Accounting & Econ. 358 (2008). 
 16 The paper was first listed on SSRN in 2006. SSRN-id919900.pdf. In the SEC report it is 
quoted for how historic cost accounting “masked” the extent of the financial problems, SEC 
Report, infra note __ at 35. The advantages of historic cost accounting in preventing cascades 
was not discussed. Indeed the term cascade is not used in the SEC report. 
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which in good times may well be biased in an upward direction. In this case, 
however, the rise in market values is based on information about fundamental 
market values (even though they turn out to be erroneous), whereas in downsides 
the bursting may be based not on valuable information about the assets but 
rather about the liquidity of financial firms purchasing those assets. 
All good things come back to haunt us, and the banks or the buyers start to 
pull back. The deleveraging that takes place represents the popping of the bubble. 
Exactly where this turning point occurs is always something of a mystery. Indeed, 
in many bubbles we think that sophisticated buyers enter the market with the 
expectation that the bubble will indeed burst, but only after they have sold their 
positions to new entrants into the market, often unsophisticated purchasers who 
are drawn into the market only after the price runs have been announced.17 
Recent experimental evidence supports the grisly outcome: “inexperienced 
traders initially expect a trajectory of constant transaction prices over time for the 
remainder of the life of the asset.”18 Bubbles are a social given. Moreover, the 
infusion of many naïve buyers and sellers into markets where valuations are not 
cut and dried (as in the experiments), means that the real-world effects are likely 
to be more not less dramatic than the experimental ones. (There is a silver lining, 
however, since the experiments show that market values converge to 
fundamental values as the trading parties gain experience.)19 
 At the point of pullback, the mark-to-market rules now switch into reverse 
gear, because the rapid decline in prices triggers obligations to sell assets in order 
to meet various contract or regulatory requirements.20 Recall at this point that 
the forces that are driving the market downward are systemic, not individual. To 
see why, put yourself in the position of someone who has to bid for asset when 
the first, or weakest, of these financial institutions falls short on its liquid reserve 
requirements. One possible way to bid is for the buyers to make estimates of the 
discounted cash flows, which could be quite respectable. One problem is that 
these assets are so complex that they present the same acute valuation question 
on the downward side that they do on the upward side, just as anyone who 
scanned the definition of the SEC’s Level 3 valuations would predict. How does 
one mark an asset to market when the market itself has entered into dangerous 
territory that no one quite understands? Liability fears, which may drive a rush to 
                                                 
17 For an account of how this might work, see ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS, 
(Oxford 2000). 
18 Haruvy, et al., Traders' Expectations, infra note __. 
19 Id.  
20 It is convenient to ignore any difference between the private and public imposition of 
duties, because this particular valuation technique generates the kind of runs on the market that 
sensible banking and investment rules are intended to avoid. 
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seize assets, force sales, or demand collateral,21 under mark-to-market rules may 
also push in the direction of low valuations. Only now the fear of liability suggests 
that the uncertainty will be resolved in favor of cautious valuations—can’t be sued 
for those—instead of more optimistic ones. 
Worse still, nothing says that potential bidders will think that these 
estimated values represent a stable resting point on which to calculate their 
optimal bids. The situation here is the inverse of that with bubbles where shrewd 
traders don’t worry about fundamental values in light of the influx of naïve 
buyers. In dangerous times, the fundamentalist approach to valuation represents 
a form of buyer myopia that professional players—the only ones left in the 
market—are not likely to suffer. It is commonly understood that the reduced sales 
prices for the first set of assets to hit the market are highly likely to require the 
next bank in line to sell its assets in order to meet the liquidity requirements that 
they face under the combined weight of the mark-to-market and mark-to-model 
rules. At this point the cycle can easily repeat itself, so that buyers will still hold 
off if they suspect that additional banks will have to sell at the same time. Exactly 
where the system strikes bottom is hard to say.  
The one point that is clear is that the constant reevaluation of assets introduces a 
measure of instability that is not found with the historic cost valuation system. 
Asset holders who found them permanently devalued—what the accountants 
called “other-than-temporary impairment”—were required to write them down 
under historical cost accounting rules, but there was much more wiggle room 
here—and thus jawboning of accountants and regulators—that made the 
marginal case much more likely to be written down in a mark-to-market world 
than the previous one. 
In contrast, historical valuation moves in both directions at a far slower 
rate. The conservatism of counterparties in the face of imperfect litigation push in 
the opposite direction when in good times. When a counterparty’s assets increase 
in value, the other party may choose not to foreclose even though it should (i.e., 
even when it receives a private signal of high risk) because it is confident that no 
court would find it liable for its actions. The inevitable imperfections of even a 
sophisticated litigation system could exacerbate bubbles as well as liquidity 
crunches. The transparency of fair value accounting thus comes at a high price. It 
is one of those unanswerable “empirical” questions of whether the necessary 
biases of historic cost accounting are more or less damaging than the likely biases 
from fair value accounting. Neither system is error free. 
 The question then arises why does any body public or private adopt this 
mark-to-market system if it has these destabilizing tendencies. One possible 
                                                 
 21 Even the automatic stay in bankruptcy may be ineffective here, since derivative 
contracts are excluded and many of the contracts responsible for the recent freezing of the credit 
markets are of this kind. 
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explanation is that the basic risk cannot be avoided. Thus assume that banks use 
historic accounting systems, which all other sophisticated parties believe 
overstate the relevant asset valuations. Well at this point, the creditors and 
regulators will run the downward valuations by themselves, so that similar 
downward pressure is exerted on the beleaguered financial institutions. But even 
if the downward pressure is the same in both cases, it does not follow that the 
intensity of that pressure will be the same. We think that the key difference here 
is much like that which is found in criminal trials. It is one thing for the state to 
accuse someone of wrongdoing, over which there can be some doubt. It is quite 
another for the criminal defendant to admit the truth of the charges raised 
against him. In the first of these scenarios there is still room for argumentation. 
In the second, there is not.  
Carried over to the financial arena, we think that the admission that there 
are capital shortages, as required by mark-to-market rules, will necessarily 
trigger other actors in the system to take the steps that are required of them 
under various regulatory or contractual schemes. Even if the counterparties do 
not want to exercise their contractual rights, because it would be, in their 
calculation, inefficient for them to do so, the public revelation of values may give 
them no choice, especially when their organizational superiors may be technically 
weaker but politically more savvy than the parties who did the initial work. In 
addition to these internal firm pressures, eager plaintiffs and their lawyers will be 
standing by to assert the breaches of duties owed to them based on publicly 
available valuations that were not acted on and turned out to be bad bets by the 
counterparty firm in which they invested. (Nor for that matter can regulators 
ignore their duties to monitor reserve requirements.)  
While a private party might act under an insecurity clause in the event of a 
decrease in the value of an asset reported under historical cost accounting, it 
could also exercise its choice to do otherwise. Mark to market leaves that party 
with no choice, and therefore destroys some transactions in which it would be 
better for everyone (including shareholders of both firms and society at large) if 
the counterparty practiced forbearance. The various lenders to private parties run 
the risk of being held liable if they do not move when the borrower has made a 
public admission of the financial distress.  
Visibility begets litigation, and there is no shortage of theories that could 
propel shareholders and creditors into taking actions not warranted on efficiency 
grounds. Most obviously, they could bring a derivative suit claiming that the firm 
was harmed by the decision not to demand collateral. Even if this action does win 
it could survive a motion for summary judgment, and thus lead to a financial 
settlement, even in Delaware, where the business judgment rule tends to shield 
directors. Other states may be more receptive to these claims. Alternatively, 
plaintiff shareholders could seek relieve in federal court in a securities fraud suit 
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based on section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5, for 
failing to reveal its material decision not to demand collateral in time of financial 
distress. 
These theories do not have to be close to airtight to create problems. The 
exposures will be greatest for Level 3 assets that are “marked to model.” For these 
assets, there is a significant amount of private information and judgment 
involved in ascertaining the value of an asset, and it is in these cases in which the 
problems courts will have in reaching the right results will be the most acute. For 
a level 3 asset, holders will be disclosing information that the court can’t 
otherwise get, and hence this can lead to a likelihood of lawsuit where, absent 
mandatory mark to model, it would not have existed. 
Consider a stylized example. Bank A has a leveraged asset originally valued 
at $100, but it is trading (in a suddenly illiquid market) for $50. Bank B is a 
counterparty that has the contractual right to demand collateral of $30 in the 
event that the value of the asset drops to this level. There is, however, great 
uncertainty about the future value of the asset. Bank B might reasonably believe 
that the asset will be worth more than $100 in the future, in which case it will be 
better off than if it seized the asset and sold it in the current market. But there 
may be a chance that the asset will be worth less, in which case the additional 
collateral will reduce Bank B’s losses. In this case, the sensible course for Bank B, 
regardless of the probabilities associated with its good-case and bad-case 
valuations, would be to demand additional collateral. 
This benevolent outcome only holds, however, when the collateral call and 
the future valuation are not correlated. If the decision to demand collateral 
somehow impacts the probabilities of the future valuations, it might make sense 
for Bank B to forbear, despite the fact that the collateral is contractually owed to 
it. This may be the case in illiquid markets when the devaluation spiral discussed 
above, caused in part by mark-to-market accounting rules, kicks in. For instance, 
if Bank B believes that by demanding the collateral from Bank A, it will force 
Bank A to sell additional assets of similar class on a fire-sale basis (say because of 
a decrease in the firm’s debt rating), the market receives another downward 
result, and the cycle begins again. Nothing in the netherworld of level 3 asset 
valuations can stand up to this kind of external pressure. (The new FASB rule 
allowing the creation of an imaginary “orderly market,” however, may help.22) 
The perilous position of Bank B under the mark-to-market rule is made 
worse because its shareholders may be poised to sue the bank board for their 
breach of fiduciary duties by failing to obtain available collateral before the bad 
state of the world comes to pass. Now we see the divergence between private and 
public costs. There could well be an efficient ex ante bargain—forbear from 
                                                 
22 FASB has proposed the rule, which at current is out for comment. See 
http://www.accountingnet.com/x65874.xml. 
  Mark to Market / 21 
exerting legal rights to resist the downward spiral—that with hindsight may look 
like a breach of fiduciary or contractual duties. If litigation costs and legal errors 
were zero, this miscalculation would never occur. But both costs are high in cases 
like these, especially when courts will struggle to distinguish between sincere and 
opportunistic claims on the part of the forbearing bank. Anecdotally, this story of 
collapsing values based on collateral calls seems to have occurred on many 
occasions during the recent credit crunch in the wake of the collapse of the 
Housing Bubble.23  
Another problem arises because of the collective nature of an efficient 
response to the downward pressure of the collateral cycle. Most banks and other 
holders of risky assets have multiple counterparties, and this creates a risk that 
these parties will not be able to coordinate an efficient collective response. The 
most obvious analogy here is to bankruptcy Treatment of a firm whose going 
concern value exceeds its current assets if sold independently. At the sign of 
distress, individual creditors may selfishly seize assets lest they be left with 
nothing if the other creditors took all the assets first. Yet everyone benefits for 
delay and orderly management. This classic prisoners’ dilemma problem is 
resolved by the Bankruptcy Code’s “automatic stay” provision, which bans 
collateral seizures in cases in which there is a plausible claim of future value that 
exceeds the value of assets in piecemeal liquidation.24  
The automatic stay thus sometimes makes sense to immobilize action in 
the face of collective insecurity. The same logic applies in the case of various 
financial instruments and assets, as it does in the case of factories or inventories. 
But, as we have shown, mark to market makes this inaction extremely costly to 
individual players who have no explicit government protection against liability. 
Even if similar problems arise with historical accounting, its inertia provides a 
buffer that works better because the borrower need not publicly admits its 
condition.  
 
VII. The Government’s Role 
 
How then to break the cycle? In practice, only one party is immune from 
this downward pressure. It is the United States, which can’t go insolvent (we 
hope) given its general power of taxation. On this score, the original Bear-Stearns 
“bailout” program was instructive. Bear Stearns was cash flow positive at the time 
that it was declared insolvent under the mark-to-market rules that forced its 
liquidation. Quite simply, it was taking in more cash than it was paying out. But 
                                                 
 23 See, e.g., Robert O'Harrow Jr. & Brady Dennis, “Downgrades and Downfall,” WASH. 
POST A01, Dec. 31, 2008 (describing the death spiral of insurance giant AIG as facilitated by a 
series of collateral calls made by investment bank Goldman Sachs in which each collateral call 
caused a downgrade in AIG’s debt rating, which in turn precipitated additional collateral calls). 
24 See 11 U.S.C. § 363. 
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what should be made of this fact? One scenario is that mark-to-market worked 
well precisely because it identified the weakness in the firm’s capital structure 
before all values were wiped out. We suspect, however, that the opposite was true 
in this instance. The mark-to-market rules functioned as Allen and Carletti 
predicted, namely to bring about the very run on the bank that the entire system 
of banking was meant to deal with. 
Perhaps these problems could have been avoided if the relevant parties, 
either public or private, had renegotiated the rules of the game to avoid the 
downward cascade. But renegotiation is costly in complex securitization markets 
on both the public and the private side. On the private side, the potential reach of 
the antitrust laws operates as a barrier to coordination. While networking 
situations receive certain limited antitrust protections, every antitrust lawyer has 
the same basic instincts. Don’t talk to your peers lest someone accuse you of 
horizontal price fixing—until of course it is too late to do any good.  
On the public side, laws are laws, and often they do not allow government 
officials to waive the rules that they are required to enforce. And even if they try, 
the rapidity of the downward cascade could preclude any effective negotiations, 
especially over complex assets. Similarly, private securitization agreements 
involve the pooling of assets so that there is no single person that trades on his or 
her own account. The ability renegotiate must deal with the deep conflicts of 
interest among the holders of different tranches of the pooled assets, whose 
different priorities indicate the order in which they are paid off. The moment a 
fixed value is attached to the portfolio, the low priority parties are wiped out. 
Without the settlement, they retain the chance that the asset value goes up. More 
generally, settlement eliminates the existing variance, and thus favors high-
priority parties over low-priority parties. Yet the perceived obstacles to 
renegotiation may easily tempt the parties to limit its scope down the line in all 
cases. That approach may be appropriate where default risks are uncorrelated, 
but it is ill-suited where the high correlation among risks creates a real liquidity 
crisis. Drafting reliable contracts to distinguish between these two situations is 
not easy. 
 
VIII. Default Rules Matter Too 
 
If we are correct in noting that mark-to-market may force action when 
inaction may be the more efficient course, no one should write contracts that 
automatically trigger defaults to public disclosures. This may be true in 
equilibrium, but the downward spirals happen, by definition, only in 
disequilibrium. As a result, we expect that even large firms can learn from their 
mistakes and thereafter effectively get the message through up and down the 
ranks. We expect therefore to observe some creative contracting in the future 
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when the dust settles. Parties, for example, could write a contract that triggers a 
collateral call only when the mark-to-market prices of various assets fall below a 
specified level under certain conditions. For instance, the call might not be 
triggered if the assets became highly illiquid and the pricing was viewed as 
unreliable. The transaction costs for such contracts may be high, however, since 
getting the triggers just right in advance and agreed to among all parties (without 
antitrust concern) may be difficult. 
Owing to these rigidities, setting a default accounting rule is likely to have a 
big impact on the ability of parties to write efficient contracts. Mark to market 
may create a background rule that inhibits the free contracting that can move 
parties to an efficient equilibrium. In a world with mark to market, it is difficult 
for the parties to waive by contract any disclosures required by regulation. First, 
removing transactions from judicial oversight may increase agency costs and 
moral hazard problems. In addition, the effort may abort if courts treat these 
waivers as breaches of nonwaivable fiduciary duties that the firm owes to the 
investors of the firm. On balance, therefore, we believe that a default rule that 
allows parties to contract around historical cost accounting provides more choice 
and flexibility than a default rule requiring disclosure, especially for large, well 
advised and represented parties who can make risk assessments and efficiently 
bear any residual losses.  
We do not think that this preference for some historical determined 
baseline will eliminate margin calls observed under mark to market. It won’t. But 
this historical default regime would reduce them on the margin, for those class of 
cases, which we believe are not trivial, in which forbearance of one’s legal rights is 
essential to preserving the value of the overall system.  
Conversely, valuation at mark-to-market levels may be misleadingly 
accurate, meaning it may suggest confidence where there is and should be none. 
Because historical cost accounting is obviously wrong, it creates an incentive for 
outsiders to conduct their own analysis of the value of assets. Where these are 
large and may have a big impact on the firm’s prospects, multiple external 
valuations will be generated. These will in turn be baked into market estimates of 
the firm’s value, thus providing the very aggregate, market-based valuation of the 
combined value of all assets that mark to market accounting hoped to achieve.  
Such an outside-in process, as required by historical cost accounting, is 
least costly when asset values are easy to figure, but provides its most important 
safety-check benefits when they are not. In those latter cases, the hoary doctrine 
of caveat emptor probably best reduces the risk of manipulation in any mark-to-
market or mark-to-model system. Where fraud becomes likely because 
articulated values may be illusory, the legal system should discourage investor 
reliance and encourage their diligence.  
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As we said above about other claims, this one should not matter in 
equilibrium. If investors and counterparties know about the potential misleading 
nature of mark-to-market or mark-to-model estimates of value, they should do 
their own valuations anyway, and adjust overall firm values accordingly. But life 
is lived on the margin, where the default rule may matter more than it optimally 
should. In addition, the stickiness of the default rule because of the litigation 
uncertainty hovering in the background makes the historical rule more attractive 
in the high transaction cost environment.  
 
IX. Final Thoughts 
 
 It is sobering to realize that so many of the issues that we have canvassed 
depend on classic empirical questions to which there are, if any, only 
approximate answers: did counterparties forbear in the way we suggested in the 
old regime? Has this changed with the adoption of mark-to-market accounting 
rules? Is there a difference between the collateral-demanding practices and 
default of private firms compared with public ones, on the assumption that 
litigation is more likely and less costly to bring in the public context? Does the 
state of incorporation, and thus the cost of bringing a suit against a bank, have an 
impact on this behavior? 
Insofar as they can be answered, these issues are topics for another day. 
Anecdotal evidence supports our analysis, but more fundamentally, it rests on 
sound theoretical assessments of the complex interaction of public accounting 
rules and private valuation decisions, when everyone wishes they would not. In 
examining the financial wreckage, we can’t lay all of the fault for the current crisis 
at the feet of mark-to-market. Bubbles preceded these rules and would follow 
their repeal or modification. But by the same token, mark-to-market made its 
own distinctive contribution to the likelihood and severity of the present crisis, 
which should not go unexamined and uncriticized. Accounting rules have bite in 
an imperfect world where courts make mistakes, stakeholders of financial 
institutions may try to extract rents from them, and where collective action is not 
always the easiest or most likely course of action. 
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